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Commentary on Harmony Peach’s “Piggybacking In? A Critical 
Discourse Analysis of Argumentation Schemes” 
 
MOIRA KLOSTER  
Philosophy  
University of the Fraser Valley  




The key claim in “Piggybacking In?” is that argument schemes such as Walton’s can build in 
power imbalances that will work against fair evaluation of arguments. The paper’s proposal for a 
solution to this problem is the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to create a nuanced 
understanding of imported prejudices.   
Linking CDA to politically-focused papers on gender bias by Al-Tamini, Ciurria, and Yap, 
Peach demonstrates how bias is revealed in language and, in turn, reveals the political impact of 
language. Biased language may prevent “social equality between opponent and defender” in the 
presentation and analysis of argument (p. 6). She cites Huckin’s presentation of CDA as a method 
aimed at identifying “textual manipulations serving non-democratic purposes.” Peach cites both 
Wodak and Huckin to show that CDA should be seen as an attitude rather than just a mechanism: 
an attitude of staying alert to concepts of power, history, and ideology within a text. The overall 
aim is to have a “highly context-sensitive, democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on 
social issues with the aim of improving society” (p. 4).   
The emphasis on democracy appears to be central to this approach to identifying bias.  The 
problem of bias is not just a question of being blind to the truth, but a problem of mistreating others 
by failing to give the right weight to their words and sotreating others unequally.  However, a 
“democratic approach” in this context seems to be ambiguous between an attitude and a procedure. 
The attitude is to see one another as equals; the procedure is to find a shared way of doing things. 
The two come together when a shared way of doing things enables us to see each other as equals. 
The assumption that shared procedures will lead to recognition of one another as equals has been 
a cornerstone of instruction in reasoning and critical thinking as far back as the 1970s. Walton’s 
schemes are one such procedure. While CDA may be more concerned with an attitude of equality, 
its technique may offer primarily procedural equality:  the list of steps to take in assessing a text, 
and a set of questions to unlock the concealed assumptions.   
Peach illustrates how CDA moves deeper than argument schemes, looking for what is not 
said, and for what is said that reveals potentially illegitimate assumptions of entitlement. In so 
doing, CDA stays within a democracy of procedure. To use CDA, we start as “ordinary readers” 
– stepping outside ourselves as much as is required to use a Principle of Charity to interpret the 
text – and then step into the more detailed but still apparently impersonal assessment of the 
argument text or schema.  
The difference between attitudinal and procedural democracy is important here, because 
there are two visions of democracy that differ in which aspect they favour. “Cosmopolitan” 
democracy favours procedural equality. The ideal of argument analysis is unbiased: we step 
outside any group identity that might make us inappropriately partisan, and view one another as 
identical in value and different only in particulars of our desires and aspirations (see, for example, 
Appiah, 2006;, or Nussbaum, 2011). “Pluralist” democracy favours attitudinal equality: no voice 
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is inherently more valuable or credible than another, and we must start by hearing each voice 
before we look for a procedure that will be equal for all (see, for example, Phillips, 2007; or Young, 
2000). 
I’d like to explore this contrast because it seems to open up ways that Peach’s argument 
might be developed. It reveals further questions we might entertain in pursuit of a less biased and 
more mutually respectful approach to argument. 
In a pluralist approach, CDA faces an immediate difficulty. No one is ever an “ordinary 
reader”. Necessarily, I come to any task from my own experience, current context, and framework.  
When I speak or read as myself, I am neither impersonal nor ahistorical. This pluralist perspective 
has one immediate advantage: it will sit better with indigenous tradition than cosmopolitan 
objectivity can, because in indigenous tradition I can speak only as myself. Whether this is an 
overall improvement on the intended cross-cultural objectivity of procedural equality will be 
considered later. 
To pursue a pluralist approach, I can first compare what is here and now with changes I 
have personally seen.  I’m in a position to see that schema were very much of the 1990s. My own 
first textbook, Constructive Critical Thinking (Gutteridge, 1995), made extensive use of schema 
as writing prompts to evaluate arguments, based on the contemporary composition theory that 
using schema would facilitate learning of complex concepts.  Walton’s schemes are more complex 
than mine were, and aimed at deeper evaluation.  But even the schemes I used were not as 
conducive to learning as I’d thought.  My second textbook, (Kloster & Anderson, 2005) dropped 
schema entirely, though it still used standard prompting questions. Both critical thinking textbooks 
were publishable, but neither would be good enough today.  From a historical perspective, schemes 
cannot be timelessly applicable.  Even “democratic” procedures will not necessarily work outside 
the timeframe and educational theory within which they were created. 
Second, as an individual assessor, I should recognize the author as an individual too.  This 
is controversial as a democratic move: it is currently more common to see the text as something 
which, once created, is an entity in itself, not an indication of, or a proxy for, the author. Whether 
the text is or should be independent of its author is a question beyond the scope of this paper, and 
I don’t mean to challenge it here. However, with respect to assessing an argument, by separating 
the text we are to examine from the person who wrote that text we are taking a more cosmopolitan 
stance.  From a pluralist stance, it is the author, not the text, who has a voice. Text can be 
approached impersonally but the author cannot.  I noticed that throughout Peach’s paper, she refers 
to authors by surname only (as I have just done in referring to her), or she frames sentences in a 
passive voice which eliminates the need for naming anyone at all. Peach’s practice sits comfortably 
within no less than three distinct traditions that use this impersonal, distancing format. The use of 
surnames only is a classic British boarding school tradition used for at least a century by teachers 
to address pupils and by pupils to address each other.  I mention this tradition because it is inimical 
to the recognition of voice. If my identity as an author was “Jackson” in school, “Gutteridge” in 
my early work, and “Kloster” in today’s work, this erases any sense of continuity between my 
works. The second tradition, the classic academic tradition for essays, combines surnames with 
passive voice. This tradition only began to change in the 1980s; in some disciplines it is still not 
acceptable to use “I” to situate “my” opinions. As with the school naming tradition, this one also 
distances voices from texts. I mention it because our ability to express our opinions in the context 
of an academic conference is still contingent on our adherence to norms of expression in 
“academia” that retain a Euro-centric and masculine bias. Peach’s argument is at least partly 
constrained by expressions which would not be used in more pluralist speech.   
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The third tradition, central to CDA, is that it is the text that matters. The author’s surname 
is a sufficient identifying tag for the text.  Here, CDA overlaps with argumentation theory.  Take 
away the phrase “context-sensitive,” and critical thinking instruction would agree entirely with 
Huckin that argument evaluation is a “democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social 
issues with the aim of improving society.”  Note the passive voice: it is the “democratic approach” 
which is the agent here, not the people in the society. Here is where both CDA and argument 
analysis stand with cosmopolitan procedural equality rather than pluralist voice-based democracy. 
To that extent, any argument analysis scheme and any CDA text analysis are both capable of 
importing bias. 
The bias comes not necessarily from seeing another person or group as inferior, but from 
applying an expertise that is privileged in discussion.  This privilege, currently afforded to people 
such as scientists, lawyers, professors, and teachers, allows the expert to downplay anecdotal 
evidence from non-experts.  A nice example Peach did not mention, but provided in private 
communication (email May 9, 2020), is of a Grade 3 teacher gently but firmly denying the reality 
that squirrels eat hamburger.  The reference is to a paper by Linker (2011) in which a teacher has 
asked the class what squirrels eat. When one student says, “Hamburger”, the teacher first doubts 
the student and then dismisses the evidence as an “unusual case”, continuing to direct the class 
towards the required answer of “acorns, nuts, and seeds.” This is an example of age bias and 
possibly socio-economic bias.  The student had personally seen a squirrel eating from a dumpster 
behind a fast food restaurant, but was not treated as a credible reporter.  Anecdotal though the 
evidence may be, any teacher who limits a science class to pre-established information misses a 
chance to confirm that squirrels are not purely vegetarian, and certainly misses a chance to get the 
children to consider how animals adapt to the human-built environment.  Linker explains that this 
teacher was clear in later conversation with the researcher that it mattered much less to have that 
student feel heard than to have all the children prepared to take the tests that would grant them 
access to a more privileged way of life. This is a bias towards expertise, defensible in 
cosmopolitanism but not pluralism: we will have equality if we achieve shared answers through 
shared procedures such as listening to experts. This is not the democracy we want to see in 
argumentation, where we have always wanted diversity of possible viewpoints in competition with 
one another much more than we have wanted rote solutions to constructing or assessing arguments. 
Looking at democracy through a pluralist lens, valuing diversity over commonality, it 
would be imperative to engage the author as well as the text. If we are going to require a context-
sensitive analysis of an argument, and aim for the “improvement of society” why would we not 
include a dialogue with the author, when available, as part of our argumentation analysis?  The 
same questions we are to ask in CDA of the text, for example, we could equally well ask of its 
author: What is presupposed and what is omitted? Pragma-dialectics works extensively with 
dialogue as key to seeing appropriate moves and responses in developing an argument. When we 
let a text serve as monologue, it’s not surprising we have to work harder to find out what it took 
for granted or forgot to mention. Would Walton have come up with the same schemes if the 
primary mode of argument was direct dialogue between two arguers? 
However, at this point, neither cosmopolitanism nor pluralism gives us quite enough 
assurance of the equality we are looking for. As Peach’s argument has shown, any cosmopolitan 
attempt to build a neutral, equal, shared procedure can “piggyback in” unequal power structures 
and attitudes.  Equally, pluralism runs into the opposite difficulty of presuming that voices can be 
raised and will be heard. Direct dialogue with the author will not help if the author is steeped in 
the power, privilege, and expertise that bias the text. The author may be incapable of recognizing 
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the bias or responding thoughtfully enough to our interlocutory questions.  One of the crucial steps 
in handling power imbalances is to recognize that the person with less power is much less likely 
to be able to face up directly to the person with more power.  Another difficulty, as Hundelby 
(2005) discusses, is that those who are oppressed or politically disadvantaged may have good 
reason not to speak openly outside their own circles. Acting to conform to the expectations of 
others, instead of presenting one’s preferred self, may be an essential component of political 
activism directed to subverting the status quo. This will work against attempts to bring together 
plural voices to negotiate shared procedures. 
Given the importance of the political dimension of language in supporting biased systems, 
there are two points made in Peach’s paper that help point us forward to mesh procedure and 
attitude. Peach’s key concern about argument schemes is that people using schemes to assess 
arguments “may falsely believe that they have performed due diligence” (p. 6).   What is “due 
diligence” in the context of argument evaluation? In particular, just as due diligence standards vary 
between professions, they could also vary between analysis contexts and argumentation contexts.  
It may be worth investigating this.  Due diligence requires both an appropriate attitude: to meet 
responsibilities for ensuring accuracy and safety, and an appropriate procedure: one which can be 
carried out to a high enough standard in the time available. Any scheme meets at best part of this 
obligation.  If we consult authors and readers, not just the text, we have an opportunity to 
understand better what our responsibilities are in a given context. 
A second, related step in Peach’s analysis is where she concurs with Yap that “different 
biases are mitigated by different strategies” and so “there cannot be an across-the-board solution 
that could be implemented for cases in which identity prejudicial stereotypes can interfere with the 
course of an argument” (9, citing Yap, 2015, p. 33).  It is this recognition that seems to me to lift 
CDA beyond procedure.  Different readers may use CDA to reach different identifications of bias 
in a text.  It would be the sum of the readings, rather than the attitude of the individual reader, that 
achieves recognition of diverse voices.  Further, there might not be a point at which an argument 
scheme has been fully addressed (p. 9). If so, we know that even if we cannot address any 
problematic bias at the moment, we can return to the text later, or ask a different pair of eyes to 
help us see it differently.  It also ensures we ourselves stay aware that our own analysis is not 
definitive. This seems to me to be a particularly crucial step in challenging the use of schemes such 
as Walton’s. It may be important to recognize that any analysis of a scheme or a specific argument 
has no final answer but should be revisited any time additional questions arise or new inequalities 
are suspected. 
I would encourage Harmony Peach to take an even stronger stand on the importance of 
both context and person in identifying systemic bias. “Piggybacking In?” points to the direction in 
which we might all prefer to move: towards recognizing that we are not in search of any 
“consensus” that squirrels eat nuts, but that squirrels, arguments, and people are much more diverse 
than any scheme could illuminate. Argument analysis should be far more flexible than schemes 
admit:  it should be an ongoing process in which we visit and revisit arguments for new insight 
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